Remarks at Singapore Institute of International Affairs Year Opener - Outlook 2025
Vivian Balakrishnan
Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Remarks at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs Year Opener “Outlook 2025 – Singapore at 60 and The Road Ahead”, 24 January 2025
Associate Professor Simon Tay, Patricia Quek, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
1 It is a pleasure to be here. 2025 is a significant year. For Singapore, [it is] SG60. It is also 80 years since the end of the Second World War. So I think this is an opportune time for us to ask three sets of fundamental questions.
2 The first set has to do with Singapore – how far have we come in 60 years? What were the factors – endogenous and exogenous – that brought us here, in this shape? The second set of questions I want you to think about is what does the current state of the world, in particular the volatility, the turmoil, the news headlines – what does this portend for Singapore? And the third set of questions is how should we respond? What does the future hold for us?
How Far Has Singapore Come?
3 Let's get on with the first set of questions. How far has Singapore come? What were the endogenous and exogenous factors? On the endogenous side, I would say our founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his generation understood the structural constraints and opportunities that Singapore faced. They made a choice to make Singapore an international city, an international finance centre, an international shipping hub. Because we are small, we cannot live by ourselves. We had to plug into global networks of trade, finance, shipping and commerce.
4 We, therefore, were pre-positioned for the last six decades of globalisation. In particular, we seized the opportunities of containerisation, just-in-time logistics, and financial globalisation. But underpinning all of this was a geopolitical foundation. The single most important exogenous factor was Pax Americana – the presence of the United States after the Second World War, which sought to maintain the rules-based international system, rules-based international order.
5 So, going back 80 years, offered a vision of a liberal world order – liberal in three separate but related senses. First, it is a rules-based order. It's not a power-based order. Second, it is an order that is open to trade, finance, and commerce. And third, it is an order which respects, at least in principle, the sovereignty and the equality of nations. Pax Americana provided that stable geopolitical foundation.
6 Singapore thrived in such a conducive world. In 1965, Singapore's GDP was US$1 billion. Last year, our GDP had grown to about US$500 billion. Our GDP per capita has grown from about US$400 to about US$72,000. We've established ourselves as a global finance centre, and a leading international shipping hub. These are not trivial achievements. We have created, along with our neighbours, a region which is today home to about US$3 trillion in regional trade.
7 But the true success of a country is not just GDP growth, not just the economy, but also the strength of our people, the strength of our institutions. I'm pleased to report that our healthcare standards are amongst the highest in the world. Our education system continues to rank highly. Our people are fundamentally at peace with one another, regardless of race, religion, or language. And we are a multiracial, multireligious, multidialect society which works.
8 I say all this not to beat the drums of triumphalism, but to urge introspection, humility, and reflection. Because our success is not our own doing alone. We have benefited immensely from luck, and from the benign external environment that Pax Americana provided.
9 But that is not enough. The second point is somewhat exogenous. Of course we have a strategic location. We are at the apex of the Strait of Malacca. But geography is not destiny. Many other countries are also strategically located, but have not done as well. The third point I want to make is that we in Singapore have always had to make ourselves useful and indispensable to great powers and great powers' interests in the region.
The Current State of the World
11 Now, that is all the last 60 years. Let us fast forward to today, because many of the factors – the benign world order, the rules-based international system, the presence of the United States – are now in flux.
12 In the years immediately following our independence, the US presence in our region was key to stopping Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. After the Cold War, the continuation of Pax Americana was still providing the geopolitical stability and the rules-based order that allowed the region and Singapore to thrive. But that is now under significant strain.
13 After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world moved from unipolarity – where the US was the sole superpower – to a situation which many have called multipolarity. But I think we need to be careful with our language. The situation is not simply multipolarity. What we're seeing is a situation where you have a major established power, the United States, but you also have rising powers, particularly China, and also Russia, which is asserting itself. And many commentators have pointed out that the United States, which had for so long been the champion of the liberal world order and the rules-based international system, is now being described by some as a revisionist power.
14 At the same time as with this shift from unipolarity to multipolarity, we are also witnessing at the technological level, a tectonic shift. The technologies of the future – artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, quantum computing – are becoming weaponised, and are becoming tools of geopolitical competition.
15 The Princeton University political scientist John Ikenberry and other commentators have pointed out that we're witnessing the weaponisation of trade, the weaponisation of technology, the weaponisation of currency – and I might add, disinformation. This is a qualitative shift in how great powers compete with one another.
16 Another tectonic shift that's occurring while the geostrategic earthquakes are occurring is that climate change is real, and the energy transition is upon us. The global economy is in transition. These are unprecedented times. And ASEAN, small economies, small countries in Southeast Asia, find themselves in the eye of the storm.
How Should Singapore Respond?
17 So let me come to the third and final set of questions. Given the state of the world, given the opportunities and the challenges, how should Singapore respond?
18 Firstly, for Singapore, we actually have no choice. We need to remain open and inclusive. As far as possible, we should not allow ourselves to be forced to take sides in the way that some of the older superpowers might wish for us to do so.
19 There are some things that have not changed in 60 years. We are still tiny, [with] no hinterland. We are still dependent on regional stability for our own security. We are still dependent on open trade and finance for our prosperity.
20 The other point which I've made in the past is that Singapore must not allow itself to get into a great power war. We will have no choice but to have good relations with both major powers, and we will try to maintain whatever space and strategic autonomy that we can.
21 But we also seek to make common cause, especially with our immediate neighbourhood. ASEAN remains one of our greatest assets. An ASEAN that is united, that speaks with one voice, that is resilient, that is constructive in its engagement with major powers – that serves all of our interests far better than an ASEAN that is divided.
22 So that means the second point here is that we have to continue to reinforce and refine the rules-based international system and the international rules and institutions that we have worked so hard to build. The UNCLOS, the WTO, the IMF – these institutions matter. Because they level the playing field for small countries. It's not perfect, but it's better than a world where might is right.
23 My third point is a bit more inward-facing. I have served three Prime Ministers. I have been up close to the making of foreign policy for more than two decades. And I want to say that Singapore's society, the resilience and the social cohesion of our multicultural, multireligious society, is perhaps our greatest asset. And we must tend to that garden with great care. Because if we are divided at home, we will not be able to project the kind of unity and influence that we need on the world stage.
Conclusion
24 Let me end by quoting Madeline Albright, a brilliant lady whom I had the privilege of meeting more than once. She said, "History is not over. History is going on. And we are the authors of history." I think this is an opportune time for us to think about how we, as Singaporeans, as ASEAN leaders and thinkers, and as participants in the global order, can be agents of history – helping to shape the future that we want to see for ourselves and our children.
25 But that is not all, because the point I also want to leave you with is that diplomacy is not a one-way street. Diplomacy is about persuasion. It's about building relationships and trust. It's about creating situations where different parties can find common ground and common interest.
26 Those of us who participate in this Great Game of Diplomacy must endeavour to keep everyone at the table, to keep the conversation going, and to help prevent the world from fracturing into irreversible blocs.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 24 January 2025